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The basic signification of adverse selection is that the market’s collocating function 
will be inefficient because of the behavior of the traders when the information is 
asymmetric. Under the condition of information asymmetry, the adverse selection behavior 
on the securities market results in underinvestment or overinvestment, which both decrease 
the market’s efficiency. The major idea of this paper is to advance feasible policies to deal 
with the adverse selection behavior on China’s securities market. This paper includes 
introduction and three chapters, the introduction introduces the researching background, 
significance and methods of this paper, the main contents of the three chapters are 
described as followings: 
Chapter one is the review of the adverse selection theories. This chapter summarizes 
the achievements of the researches on adverse selection. Theoretically, we can deal with 
the adverse selection by signal transferring and information discriminating, which provide 
the theoretical basis for us to advance methods to deal with the adverse selection behavior 
on China’s securities market. 
Chapter two analyses the phenomena, results and reasons of the adverse selection 
behavior on China’s securities market. The adverse selection is represented by the decrease 
of quality of the new listed companies and the weak correlation between the price and 
performance of the listed companies. We analyze how the adverse selection behavior 
results in underinvestment or overinvestment by game theory, and the reasons for the 
information asymmetry which leads to adverse selection directly from the following 
factors: information source, information channel and information sink. 
Chapter three advances the methods and puts forward policies to deal with the adverse 
selection behavior on China’s securities market. The first method is to perfect information 
disclosure system, the second method is to intensify signal show. We need to perfect the 
securities market bodies including the listed companies, agencies and the investors and 
ameliorate the information disclosure system. We need to encourage the listed companies 
to form steady dividend policy so as to use the dividend signal, and change the 
management-mechanism of the commercial banks and found the credit standing system for 
the listed companies so as to use the commercial banks loans signal. 
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门”领域，造成低水平重复建设（潘敏和金岩，2003）。[18]据统计，在 2001 年有 211
家上市公司涉足委托理财，金额高达 234 亿元，2004 年 1 月至 2005 年 2 月份，共有
67 家上市公司涉足委托理财，上市公司及其子公司先后委托理财 96 次，金额累计
60.97 亿元，平均每家公司有 9055 万元进行理财。① [19]2003 年仅下半年就有 75 家上





                                                        
① 资料来源：www.xinhuanet.com(新华网)，《67 家上市公司涉足委托理财》，载自《中国证券报》，曾仁，2005-2-25。 
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